Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to inaction in the Security Council by Koester, Chelsea
Florida Journal of International Law 
Volume 27 Issue 3 Article 3 
January 2015 
Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to inaction in the Security 
Council 
Chelsea Koester 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil 
Recommended Citation 
Koester, Chelsea (2015) "Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to inaction in the Security Council," Florida 
Journal of International Law: Vol. 27 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
NOTES
LOOKING BEYOND R2P FOR AN ANSWER TO INACTION IN
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Chelsea Koester*
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 378
II. THE V ETO POW ER ....................................................................... 379
A. Inclusion in the U.N. Charter .............................................. 379
B. Application of the Veto Power ............................................. 379
C. Problematic Uses of the Veto Power ................................... 380
1. Private Sessions ............................................................. 380
2. To Shield Another State from Security
C ouncil A ction ............................................................... 381
3. The Cascade Effect ........................................................ 381
4. To Prevent Security Council Action in
Response to Humanitarian Crises .................................. 382
III. RESPONSE TO INACTION: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT DOCTRINE ................................................................... 383
A. Establishment of R2P ........................................................... 383
B. Limitations of the R2P Doctrine .......................................... 384
1. Tied to the Security Council .......................................... 385
2. Susceptibility to Abuse .................................................. 385
3. Questionable Legal Basis ............................................... 387
C. Evaluation of R2P as a Solution to Security
C ouncil Inaction ................................................................... 387
IV. EXISTING CONTROLS ON THE VETO POWER ................................ 388
A. Obligatory Abstention .......................................................... 388
1. Defining Obligatory Abstention .................................... 388
2. Practical Application of the Obligatory Abstention ....... 389
3. Evaluation of Obligatory Abstention as a
Solution to Security Council Inaction ............ 390
B. The Uniting for Peace Resolution ........................................ 390
1. Justification for the Uniting for Peace Resolution ......... 390
J.D. magna cum laude, May 2015, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Author
is currently clerking for U.S. Magistrate Judge James M. Hopkins in the Southern District of
Florida.
1
Koester: Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to inaction in the Security Coun
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. Substance and Application of the Uniting for
Peace R esolution ............................................................ 391
3. Limitations on the Uniting for Peace Resolution ........... 394
4. Evaluation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a
Solution to Security Council Inaction ............................ 396
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 396
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of the inability, or perhaps lack of will, of the U.N.
Security Council to respond to humanitarian crises is one that has
received no shortage of attention. The world has watched as the Security
Council has failed to take action to address situations in Kosovo and
Rwanda, and more recently in Syria and Ukraine. These failures to act
have left the international community scrambling to find alternative ways
to respond in the face of international crises.
This note identifies the veto power as the root of the ineffectiveness
of the Security Council and examines ways in which this power is used
to thwart international action both within and beyond the Security
Council. It will then examine a fairly recent response to this inaction, the
development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which argues that
states have a responsibility to take action in the face of international
crises, and evaluate how well poised this doctrine is to respond to this
problem.
As an alternate to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, this note
assesses two potential checks on the veto power that are already
established in international law. First, the obligatory abstention housed
within the U.N. Charter, which limits the ability of a Security Council
member to exercise its veto power when it is a party to the dispute being
addressed by the Security Council. Second, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, which provides the only possibility of an override of a
Security Council veto through General Assembly action.
While none of these three instruments provide perfect solution to the
longtime problem of the power wielded by the five veto-holding states, I
argue that the two options already established within international law,
the obligatory abstention and the Uniting for Peace Resolution, are
worthy-and even superior-alternatives with which to address this issue
and should not be overlooked. At a minimum, they present a useful tool
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II. THE VETO POWER
A. Inclusion in the UN. Charter
Throughout negotiation of the U.N. Charter (Charter) the veto power
was a contentious issue, with the major powers insistent on its inclusion.'
Concern about the veto power, which belonged to the five permanent
members of the Security Council, was immediately asserted. Soon after
the United Nations passed the Charter, one commentator stated "[t]he
inevitable effect of conferring the right of veto upon each of the
permanent members is that no decision of any importance can be taken
against the will of one of the privileged states even if the state is involved
in the matter to which the decision refers."2 In the decades since, it has
become clear that these concerns were not without merit.
B. Application of the Veto Power
As the enforcement mechanism of the United Nations, the Security
Council (the Council) is responsible for the maintenance of international
peace and security and is the only U.N. body which can issue binding
resolutions on a Member State.3 The Security Council has fifteen
Member States, including five permanent members-Russia, China, the
United States, France, and Britain-often referred to as the Permanent 5
or the P-5.4 The ten non-permanent members are elected for two-year
terms and are prohibited from serving consecutive terms.
5
The voting requirements within the Security Council differ based on
1. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506,
507 (1995).
2. Hans Kelsen, Organization and Procedure of the Security Council of the United
Nations, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1087, 1111 (1946). Another commentator of the time, J.L. Brierly,
also expressed concern regarding the veto provisions, stating "[it is certain.. . that the veto power
has made impossible that enforcement measures should ever be taken against a Great Power" and
"[t]hus the desire for a system of security ready always for immediate action, which was the
leading motive behind the substitution of the Charter for the Covenant, has resulted in a system
that can be jammed by the opposition of a single Great Power." J.L. Brierly, The Covenant and
the Charter, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 83, 89, 91 (1946).
3. Richard Butler, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, I PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L
AFF. 23, 26-27 (2012); Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More
Representative Body of the Entire U.N. Membership, 12 PACE INT'L L. REv. 319, 325 (2000).
4. Brian Cox, United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible
Consequences, 6 S.C.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 89, 92 (2009).
5. Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for
a Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 319, 328 (2000). These ten spots are
traditionally distributed as: two to Asia, three to Africa, two to Latin America and the Caribbean,
two to Western Europe and others, and one to Eastern Europe. Cox, supra note 4, at 92.
3
Koester: Looking Beyond R2P for an Answer to inaction in the Security Coun
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
whether the vote is considered procedural or substantive.6 For votes on
procedural matters, nine affirmative votes are required.7 For votes on
substantive matters, an affirmative vote of nine members of the Security
Council, including the concurring vote of each of the P-5, is required.8
Through the requirement of concurring votes of the P-5, the Charter gives
these states the power to veto a substantive matter by not casting a
concurring vote.
9
This power allows the P-5 to have a veto in four situations.'° First,
they may veto any substantive and binding decision of the Council."
Second, they may veto a recommendation to the General Assembly
(Assembly) of a Secretary-General appointment.12 Third, they can veto
state membership applications for the United Nations. 13 Finally, they can
veto any amendment to the Charter.14 This Note will focus on the first
instance, the veto of a substantive and binding decision of the Council,
which allows the P-5 to veto the passage of Council resolutions.
C. Problematic Uses of the Veto Power
The use of the veto by the five members which hold this power has
led to increasing deadlock in the Security Council. Additionally, its
influence extends beyond the Security Council to other bodies of the
United Nations. What seems like a relatively minor aspect of how the
United Nations functions has become one of the greatest impediments in
its fight to stay relevant and responsive in the face of international crises.
In exploring how this power hampers Security Council and United Nation
actions, I will examine four main ways in which the use of the veto power
has proven problematic.
1. Private Sessions
The first problem with the P-5 veto power is that it has implications
6. U.N. Charter art. 27; Cox, supra note 4, at 92-93.
7. Cox, supra note 4, at 92.
8. Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 327.
9. Id.; Interestingly, the question of whether a matter is considered procedural or
substantive is considered a substantive question, opening the door for a P-5 party to vote that a
matter is substantive in order to subject a final vote on the matter to its veto power. Cox, supra
note 4, at 93. This is known as the double-veto. This possibility initially concerned many states,
however, it has not turned out to be an issue as the double veto was not used after 1959 because
of an informal agreement between the P-5. JAN WOUTERS & TOM RuYs, ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR
INT'L RELATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM, A NEW VETO FOR A NEW CENTURY? 8 (2005).
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far beyond an official veto vote. The P-5 sometimes threaten the use of a
veto behind closed doors to convince a state not to bring a dispute to the
attention of the Council. Alternately, the P-5 use their power to persuade
states not to vote on certain resolutions, which results in what is known
as a "hidden veto," where there are an insufficient number of member
votes and the proposal is therefore automatically rejected.15 The Council
has continued to undertake most of its negotiations behind closed doors,
only meeting in public to adopt resolutions on which it has already
reached agreement.16 This means that the true implications of the veto
power are seldom seen and nearly impossible to measure.
2. To Shield Another State from Security Council Action
Another problematic use of the veto power occurs when P-5 states use
their veto to prevent the passage of resolutions that are contrary to the
interests of an ally state. This practice is known as voting "in defense of
their client state."'7 One of the most noticeable examples of this use of
the veto is the United States use of the veto on behalf of Israel.18
3. The Cascade Effect
The influence of the veto has a tendency to extend beyond the confines
of the Security Council. In what has been referred to as the cascade effect,
P-5 countries are able to wield this power in many other settings. When
U.N. elections are held for any agency, committee, or commission, the P-
5 are almost always awarded a seat because of their power and
influence. 19 Although there is no ability to veto within these settings, the
P-5 are often able to use their power to veto in the Council to encourage
action in line with their interests in many other bodies of the United
15. Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 327.
16. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 518. Former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations,
Richard Butler, confirmed that based on his time as part of the Security Council, he would estimate
that 98% of work is done in private chambers while 2% is done in the public chamber. Butler,
supra note 3, at 30.
17. Butler, supra note 3, at 31. In 1946, Kelsen predicted this powers saying that "members
which have no such right may be induced to secure for themselves the friendship and protection
of one of the five great powers." Kelsen, supra note 2, at 1119. He even went so far as to say that
it was more important for a state that was not a P-5 member to have a friend or protector within
the P-5 than to comply with existing law because with this protection, no action could be taken
against them even in the event of a flagrant violation of the Charter. Id.
18. In fact, vetoes relating to the Israel/Palestine situation account for nearly half of all
vetoes by the United States. JAN WOUTERS & TOM RuYs, SECURITY COUNSEL REFORM: A NEW
VETO FOR A NEW CENTURY? 15 (Academia Press for the Royal Institute of for International
Relations, Egmont Paper No. 9, Aug. 2005).
19. Butler, supra note 3, at 31.
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Nations.20
4. To Prevent Security Council Action in Response to
Humanitarian Crises
Throughout the history of the United Nations, and increasingly in
recent years, P-5 members have utilized and threatened to utilize vetos to
stand in the way of actions in response to international crises. This veto
can be used by a member of the P-5 both to shield another aggressor state,
as discussed above, and to shield itself when it is the aggressor. The
situations in Kosovo and Rwanda provide examples of this use of the veto
power.
When the Security Council considered its response to the fighting in
Kosovo in 1998, China and Russia firmly indicated their intention to veto
any use of armed force by the United Nations.21 The inability of the
Council to react to the killing of thousands of civilians eventually led to
action outside of the United Nations. In March of 1999, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) began a bombing campaign against
President Milosevic's regime.22 Although it seemed apparent that this
action, taken without any Security Council authorization, was in violation
of international law, it was well received. In fact, a Security Council
resolution criticizing NATO's apparent violation of the Charter's
prohibition on force was defeated by a vote of twelve to three.23 A U.N.
developed commission that investigated the NATO intervention found
the intervention to be "illegal but legitimate."
24
A similar deadlock occurred in the Security Council during the
Rwandan genocide in 1994.25 When the Security Council considered
authorizing intervention forces in Rwanda, France and the United States
blocked it and then used their hidden veto to assure that the situation was
not labeled a "genocide," which has significance in requiring action from
Member States.26 Five years later, the United Nations issued a Report of
the U.N. Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, which concluded that "[t]he
Security Council itself bears responsibility for the hesitance to support
new peacekeeping operations" and "for its lack of political will to stop
20. Id.
21. WOUTERS& RuYs, supra note 18, at 17.
22. Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States Defending Humanitarian Intervention:
Examining Viable Arguments Before the International Court of Justice, 40 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 167, 190 (2012).
23. Id.
24. Chelsea O'Donnell, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An Examination
of the Debate over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 557,
565 (2014).
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the killing.,
27
IIl. RESPONSE TO INACTION: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT DOCTRINE
At the center of almost any current debate centering on the
ineffectiveness of the Security Council is the emerging Responsibility to
Protect Doctrine, known as R2P. This doctrine focuses on the
responsibility of each state to protect its own citizens and the ability of
other states to take action when this responsibility is shirked. However,
as is explored below, this doctrine suffers from intense debate regarding
almost every aspect of its source and application. This underlying
uncertainty has resulted in an inconsistent application of the R2P doctrine
and leaves it as a questionable solution for countering Security Council
inaction.
A. Establishment of R2P
Following the unapproved action taken by the North American Trade
Organization (NATO) in response to human rights violations in Kosovo
as well as the overall failure of the international community to act in
response to the Rwandan genocide, the international community began to
question the ability of the United Nations to respond to these situations.
28
In his 2000 Millennium Report to the General Assembly, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan addressed the conflict between state sovereignty and
the need for action in response to these crises and issued a challenge for
the resolution of these two principles.29 The next year, the Canadian
developed International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report titled The Responsibility to
Protect.
30
Although prior to this report there were discussions of a right or
responsibility to act in the face of a humanitarian crisis, this was the first
instance of this formulation and title. The title stuck and now the doctrine
27. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Dec. 16, 1999, S/1999/1257, at 32, 37.
28. Andrew M. Bell, Using Force Against the "Weapons of the Weak": Examining A
Chemical-Biological Weapons Usage Criterion for Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Under
the Responsibility to Protect, 22 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 261, 276 (2014).
29. Id. at 282.
30. Dana Michael Hollywood, It Takes A Village... or at Least A Region: Rethinking
Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century, the Hope and Promise of African Regional
Institutions, 19 FLA. J. INI 'L L. 75, 98 (2007); Michael Small, An Analysis of the Responsibility
to Protect Program in Light of the Conflict in Syria, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 179, 180
(2014).
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itself is often broadly referred to as the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P.
The ICISS formulation intended to shift the focus from a right to
intervene into a duty of each state to protect its own citizens and the
responsibility of other states to act when a state fails in this duty.
3 1
According to ICISS, this responsibility to protect defeats the principle of
non-intervention in such cases.
32
This report brought the idea of R2P to the forefront of the international
community and at the 2005 World Summit the United Nations General
Assembly endorsed R2P, although it did not approve the entire ICISS
report.33 Notably, while the ICISS version of R2P had supported the
unauthorized humanitarian interventions in extreme cases34, the United
Nations version focused only on peaceful and preventative measures.
35
Although reaction to this endorsement was generally positive among
supporters of R2P, some attacked this weakened version, labeling it
"R2P-lite."
36
B. Limitations of the R2P Doctrine
The amount of discussion surrounding R2P's potential successes and
weaknesses is too extensive to survey in this note. However, it is
important to examine certain criticisms as they relate directly to how apt
this doctrine is to remedying Security Council inaction. Therefore, I will
not address concerns surrounding allegations that R2P is an assault on
state sovereignty or other arguments which, while valid in discussing the
validity of R2P, are not necessarily indicative of its ability to help with
the Security Council situation. Instead, I will focus on three aspects of
R2P that directly contribute to its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in
providing a way forward in the face of Security Council deadlock.
3 1. John F. Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes ofAge? A Sceptic's View, 18
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 421-22 (2012).
32. Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine ofAnticipatory
Counter- Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation I tervention, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 151, 201 (2002).
33. Jamie Herron, Responsibility to Protect: Moral Triumph or Gateway to Allowing
Powerful States to Invade Weaker States in Violation of the U.N. Charter?, 26 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 367, 372 (2012); Hollywood, supra note 25, at 101.
34. See Brighton Haslett, No Responsibility for the Responsibility to Protect: How
Powerful States Abuse the Doctrine, and Why Misuse Will Lead to Disuse, 40 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 171, 188 (2014).
35. Monica Hakimi, Toward A Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALE J.
INT'L L. 247, 252-53 (2014).
36. Id. at 253; Bell, supra note 28, at 302; Small, supra note 30, at 181-82.
[Vol. 27
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1. Tied to the Security Council
With this in mind, the most relevant criticism focuses on the fact that
many formulations, and notably the one endorsed by the United Nations
and ICISS, still focus on the Security Council as the foremost authority
in authorizing military action.37 The ICISS report insisted that ultimate
authority for the use of R2P remained with the Security Council.38 As a
response to recent deadlocks in the Security Council, ICISS urged P-5
members to pledge not to veto action for humanitarian crises when their
vital interests were not at stake.39 However, despite this Pollyanna
outlook, the report did present two alternative methods when the Security
Council was caught in a deadlock.4 ° Interestingly, later reports by the
Secretary-General emphasized the Security Council as the only authority
which could approve action under the R2P and did not mention these two
alternatives.
41
2. Susceptibility to Abuse
While the R2P movement has garnered strong support, some smaller
states have expressed concern that it could pose as a pretext for politically
motivated military actions by larger states.42 Unfortunately, this concern
has been realized through the inconsistent application of R2P principles.
43
There are numerous examples of R2P being used as justification for
controversial action by a state or organization. In contrast, in other cases
where intervention seemed objectively justified under the R2P doctrine,
none was taken.
In 2003, both the United States and the United Kingdom framed the
invasion of Iraq as an application of R2P, alleging that ending Saddam
Hussein's tyranny justified humanitarian intervention.44 Unable to gain
37. Bell, supra note 28, at 283-84.
38. Halil Rahman Basaran, Responsibility to Protect: An Explanation, 36 Hous. J. INT'L L.
581, 591 (2014).
39. Bell, supra note 28, at 284; Hollywood, supra note 30, at 100.
40. Haslett, supra note 34, at 189; Major Jeremy A. Haugh, Beyond R2P: A Proposed Test
for Legalizing Unilateral Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 221 MIL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2014)
(interestingly, in its report, ICISS specifically mentioned two such alternates: (I) Action by
regional organizations and (2) the Uniting for Peace Resolution).
41. Haugh, supra note 40, at 15.
42. Herron, supra note 33, at 372; Thomas G. Weiss, R2p After 9/l and the World Summit,
24 WIs. INT'L L.J. 741, 748-49 (2006) (reporting the remarks of the Algerian President, stating
"[wie do not deny that the United National has the right and the duty to help suffering humanity,
but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because
sovereignty is our last defense against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking
part in the decision-making process of the Security Council.").
43. Haslett, supra note 34, at 190.
44. Bell, supra note 28, at 292.
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the support of the Security Council, the action was implemented without
its approval.45 This use of R2P to justify military action has been
characterized as a misuse of the doctrine and is blamed for increasing
mistrust in the use of R2P.46 Next, in 2008, Russia pointed to Georgia's
failure to protect Russian citizens within its borders as justification for
invading the country, although there were few who believed there was a
true humanitarian motivation.47 Finally, in 2011 as protests in Libya
turned violent, R2P was put into action through a Security Council
resolution which established a no-fly zone over Libya and famously
authorized Member States to "take all necessary measures.'48 Initial
support for the intervention dissipated as the extent of NATO airstrikes
became clear and many began to see the action as a guise for regime
change. 49 Russia and China, who abstained from the vote passing the
resolution, were extremely upset about the extent of the airstrikes and the
use of a Security Council resolution to secure regime change.
50
Although this aggressive use of R2P was damaging to its case, this
harm was magnified when it became apparent that when P-5 members
did not have a strong enough incentive, action would not be taken even
in the face of a developing humanitarian crises.51 A prime example of its
non-use is found in the Syria situation.52 When violence erupted in Syria
in 2011, the international community took notice and urged the Security
Council to take action.53 However, the Security Council was unable to
pass a resolution on the matter due to the repeated vetoes of Russia and
China.54 They voiced wariness to authorize military intervention due to
concerns that the bounds of appropriate action authorized by a resolution
would be overstepped, as in the case of Libya.55 This selective use of R2P
has been the basis for one of the most significant critiques of the R2P
doctrine-that its use, or lack of, often coincides with a state's interests
in that region.
56
45. Weiss, supra note 42, at 749-51.
46. Id.
47. Bell, supra note 28, at 292-93; Robert P. Chatham, Defense of Nationals Abroad: The
Legitimacy of Russia's Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLA. J. INT'L L. 75, 81 (2011).
48. O'Donnell, supra note 24, at 566.
49. Id. at 566-67; Alexandra T. Steele, One Nation's Humanitarian Intervention is
Another's Illegal Aggression: How to Govern International Responsibility in the Face of Civilian
Suffering, 35 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 100 (2012).
50. Murphy, supra note 31, at 429-30; O'Donnell, supra note 24, at 566.
51. Bell, supra note 28, at 298.
52. Murphy, supra note 31, at 432.
53. Small, supra note 30, at 190.
54. Id. at 190-91.
55. Id. at 190.
56. Id. at 195.
[Vol. 27
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3. Questionable Legal Basis
Equally frustrating to the consistent application of R2P is the debate
over whether it constitutes legitimate international law.57 Some claim that
R2P is a developing or established customary international law,5" or even
a general principle of international law.59 The ICISS Responsibility to
Protect Report pointed to several sources for the foundation of such a
responsibility, although none has been affirmatively adopted in the years
since.60 As a result, any discussion of its legal source remains subject to
intense debate.
6'
This lack of a clear legal basis also lends to the argument that R2P
undermines international law by allowing action that is clearly outside
the bounds of what is authorized under the Charter.62 This reasoning
follows the logic of a slippery slope argument, where any action outside
the rules corrodes the system as it becomes more and more acceptable to
take action despite a lack of Security Council approval.63 This fractured
approach to international action is exactly what the United Nations was
formed to prevent.64
C. Evaluation of R2P as a Solution to Security Council Inaction
These three areas of criticism highlight the problems that are in the
way of R2P serving as an effective solution to addressing international
crises when a P-5 member wishes to prevent such action. The fact that
the R2P doctrine remains tied to action through the Security Council is
the main impediment to it serving as a solution to inaction in that body.
Although earlier formulations of R2P suggested that in cases of a Council
impasse the international community should take action outside the
Council, the version adopted by the United Nations excluded these ideas.
Further, the public's willingness to accept action taken without Council
approval has been considerably weakened by the apparent abuses of R2P
as a pretext for military action. The actions taken in Iraq and Libya may
have served to strengthen support for the principle of non-intervention
rather than gathering support for the ICISS proposition that this principle
should be subordinate to the responsibility to act in these crises.65
57. Haslett, supra note 34, at 179.
58. O'Donnell, supra note 24, at 578-80; Steele, supra note 44, at 109-10; Weiss, supra
note 42, at 743.
59. Basaran, supra note 38, at 582-83.
60. Haslett, supra note 34, at 179-80.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Bell, supra note 28, at 267.
63. Id. at 297.
64. Brierly, supra note 2, at 90.
65. See Weiss, supra note 42, at 750.
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Clarification of the principles of R2P and concrete rules governing its
application will be necessary before the international community is
willing to accept this principle as a legitimate method of addressing crises
without the risk of abuse.
IV. EXISTING CONTROLS ON THE VETO POWER
In contrast to the R2P doctrine, there are two mechanisms which are
firmly established in international law and provide a method with which
to either limit the use of a veto or take action in spite of one. However,
these two tools also have important limitations which must be addressed
in order to maximize their effectiveness.
First, the obligatory abstention found within the U.N. Charter prevents
use of veto in certain instances. Although a potentially powerful check
on the veto power when a State is a party to a dispute, in practice it has
been minimized and is the weaker of the two. Second, the Uniting for
Peace Resolution provides authorization to the General Assembly to take
action in the face of Security Council inaction. This resolution has been
used in the past to effectively override a Security Council veto and, other
than disfavor among P-5 states, nothing limits its applicability.
A. Obligatory Abstention
1. Defining Obligatory Abstention
Although the veto power grants P-5 members a great deal of power,
the Charter does include a limit on its use known as the obligatory
abstention, found in Article 27(3) of the Charter. Under Article 27(3) of
the U.N. Charter, when dealing with substantive matters, a Security
Council member who is a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting "in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52. ' ' 66 The
requirements of Article 27(3) boil down to three main elements: first, that
it is a substantive matter; second, that a member of the Council is a party
to the dispute; and, third, that the decision falls under either Chapter VI,
dealing with pacific settlement of disputes, or Article 52(3), governing
pacific settlements of disputes through regional agreements or agencies.
67
Despite its apparent promise in limiting the veto power, all three of
these elements are less than concrete and provide P-5 members the
opportunity to change the characterization of a set of circumstances in
66. U.N. Charter art. 27, para 3.
67. Suyash Paliwal, Note, Reviewing and Reconsidering Medellin v. Texas in Light of the
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order to prevent application of the abstention. For instance, whether an
issue is a substantive or procedural issue can be considered a substantive
question subject to a Security Council vote, and therefore also a P-5 veto.
Another way states aim to circumvent the application of the abstention
is by avoiding the labels of "party" or "dispute." States have often
disagreed as to what level of involvement is required in order to make
one a "party," which eventually resulted in the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) weighing in on the issue and creating a decision
mechanism.68 States similarly avoid the term "dispute," instead using the
term "situation."69 No definition was ever established for either term,
although there was an early effort to clearly define what constituted a
"dispute."70 Therefore, states continue to use this alternate terminology
to prevent its application. Finally, whether the requirement that the
dispute is one dealt with under Chapter VI is met is often difficult to
discern as the Security Council rarely makes clear which chapter it is
acting pursuant to. However, forcible measures are typically viewed as
falling under Chapter VII of the Charter and therefore are not impacted
by the obligatory abstention.
71
2. Practical Application of the Obligatory Abstention
At the outset of the United Nations, Member States were respectful of
the obligatory abstention and refrained from voting on matters which
were implicated, often citing specifically to Article 27(3).72 However,
states have since progressed away from this voluntary enforcement of the
abstention and often when a state does abstain from a vote, it claims to
do so voluntarily and not due to any obligation under Article 27(3).
73
Because the obligatory abstention is rarely mentioned during Council
debates, its discussion when several countries questioned the ability of
68. Paliwal, supra note 67, at 560; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Nambia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 25 (June 21). If there is a disagreement as to whether a
Council member is a party to a dispute, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that the
Council must make a prior determination that (1) there is a dispute and that (2) a member of the
Council is a party to that dispute. 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 24. This can be decided through either a
Council vote, or a Presidential ruling. Paliwal, supra note 67, at 560-61. While this preliminary
finding requirement is not found in the Charter, and therefore subject to criticism, one
commentator praised the ruling as taking account of the practical need for a clear rule. Kirgis
states that this rule will allow a "straightforward Council determination, on a case-by-case basis"
and will reduce the chance that a permanent member would then ignore a Council decision under
Chapter VI if they did not feel they needed to abstain. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 511.
69. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 511.
70. Id.
71. Paliwal, supra note 67, at 548.
72. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 511.
73. WOUTERS & Ruys, supra note 18, at 13.
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France to veto a resolution proved insightful. France, in response to the
allegation it should abstain from voting because of Article 27(3), stated
that it could present a list of situations where a state in a similar situation
to France had used their veto without challenge from anyone within the
Council.74 This interchange suggests that P-5 members are often wiling
to turn a blind eye when a fellow P-5 member chooses to exercise its veto
although it is arguably prohibited by the obligatory abstention.
3. Evaluation of Obligatory Abstention as a Solution to Security
Council Inaction
The numerous grey areas present in defining when the obligatory
abstention applies in practice mean that it is presently more of an illusory
than actual limit on the veto power. However, despite its limitations,
Article 27(3) does present a rare situation where a P-5 power would be
prevented from vetoing a substantive vote and therefore should not be
overlooked. Once the threat of the veto from that state is gone, it is
possible for the Council to then recommend procedures for settlement
under Article 36 with the hope that the P-5 member would feel pressure
to abide by the recommendations.
75
Therefore, it is worth the effort to push for a more concrete definition
of these elements in order to make the abstention a real check on the veto
power. Although the chances of convincing the P-5 to agree to a limit on
their own veto power may be slim, many would have made the same
argument regarding the Security Council supporting the idea of R2P not
too long ago. Considering the fact that the international community is
growing tired of being rendered ineffective by the Security Council's
failure to act, there is no better time to make this effort.
B. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
1. Justification for the Uniting for Peace Resolution
Frustrated with the deadlock in the Council during the Cold war
period due to systematic vetoes by the Soviet Union, the General
Assembly (Assembly) passed Resolution 377A(V), the Uniting for Peace
Resolution (Resolution) in 1950.76 The Resolution was introduced by the
United States and sponsored by seven states.7 7 It passed on November 3,
74. See id. at 14.
75. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 508.
76. James E. Hickey, Jr., Challenges to Security Council Monopoly Power Over the Use
of Force in Enforcement Actions: The Case of Regional Organizations, 10 lus GENTIUM 77, 96-
97 (2004).
77. Harry Reicher, The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Its
[Vol. 27
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1950 with a vote of fifty-two to five, with two abstentions.
78
At the time, there was debate over whether the Resolution was a
legitimate delegation of power to the Assembly under the Charter.7 9 The
argument in support of the Resolution was that Article 41(1) of the
Charter secures to the Security Council the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, which left open the
position for a secondary guarantor of this responsibility. The preamble of
the Resolution reflects this reasoning, stating "that failure of the Security
Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member
States . . does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the
United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain
international peace and security."
80
This view was substantiated in Certain Expenses, which dealt with the
apportionment of expenses for U.N. peacekeeping operations.8 1 In this
case, the ICJ found that the Council's responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security is primary, but not exclusive.
8 2
Therefore the Assembly does not have to defer to the Council under Art
11(2) of the U.N. Charter unless enforcement action is necessary.
83
2. Substance and Application of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
Although the Resolution contained several parts, the most relevant
part of the Resolution, Part A, states that:
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security in any case
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including
in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of
Passage, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7-9 (1981). The seven sponsoring states were Canada,
France, Philippines, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Id.
78. Id.
79. James Fergusson Hogg, Peace-Keeping Costs and Charter Obligations-Implications
of the International Court of Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 1230, 1234 (1962).
80. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 10 (1950).
81. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 168 (July 20).
82. Id.; Kirgis, supra note 1, at 533; David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of
Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 931
(1996).
83. Kirgis, supra note 1, at 534.
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armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international
peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-
four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session
shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of
any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United
Nations.
84
Other parts of the Resolution calling for a Peace Observation
Commission, Collective measures Committee, and national armies for
use "for services on behalf of the United Nations" were considered a dead
letter by the 1950s.85 Therefore, I will focus on Part A, which remains in
full force.
The Resolution spells out four preconditions required in order for the
Assembly to act pursuant to the Resolution.86 First, the Security Council
must have failed "to exercise primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security."87 Second, the Council's "failure"
must have been due to a "lack of unanimity of the permanent members."
88
Third, there must "appear[ ] to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression."'89 And finally, as inferred from the above
requirements, the Council must have dealt with the issue before the
Assembly can take any action on the matter.
90
Once these conditions are met, the Resolution is available for use. The
Assembly can consider a matter pursuant to the Resolution under either
of two referral procedures. First, the matter can be referred by the
Security Council, with a vote of nine members.91 Because the vote of the
Security Council on whether to refer the matter is a procedural one, it is
not subject to the veto under Article 27(2) of the Charter.92 Second, the
Assembly can consider a matter through a majority vote of the Member
States of the United Nations. A vote by the Assembly can be triggered at
the request of any Member State to invoke the Resolution.93 Once the
84. This vote now requires nine votes as with any procedural Council vote. Morriss, supra
note 82, at 805 n.8. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 10 (1950).
85. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 11 (1950).
86. Reicher, supra note 77, 9-20
87. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 10 (1950).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Reicher, supra note 77, at 9-20.
91. Morriss, supra note 82, at 805 n.8.
92. Id.
93. Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights: Casualty of the War on Terror, 25 T. JEFFERSON L.
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referral has the requisite number of votes, the matter can be considered
by the Assembly while it is in session, or, in the case that it is not, at an
emergency meeting with 24-hour notice.
94
While there are grey areas within these requirements, such as who
decides what constitutes a "failure" of the Security Council or what
constitutes the appearance of a threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act
of aggression," it is considered well-settled that a veto by a P-5 member
of the Council constitutes a failure to act.96 This has momentous
implications in that it means that when a P-5 member vetoes a Council
vote, the matter can then be referred to the General Assembly, which can
hold an emergency meeting and, with a 2/3 vote, effectively override the
veto with an Assembly resolution on the matter.
97
The Construction of a Wall Case provides a clear example of how the
Resolution can be used as a work-around to a Security Council veto, and
perhaps also why the Resolution fell out of favor with the United States.
In response to two failed attempts of the Security Council to pass a
Resolution responding to a dispute over the legality of an Israeli wall in
the West Bank due to a veto by the United States, the General Assembly
convened an emergency session pursuant to the Resolution in May
1997. 98 This emergency session was re-convened repeatedly throughout
the following years, and eventually resulted in Resolution ES-10/14 in
December 2003, in which the Assembly requested an advisory opinion
from the ICJ on the matter.
99
In deciding the case, the ICJ first had to evaluate whether it had proper
jurisdiction of the matter, which meant that it had to decide whether a
referral from an emergency session pursuant to the Resolution was
legitimate. The Court, in a press release issued on the opinion,
summarized its findings in the area, stating:
REv. 317, 435-56 (2003); Robert D. Powers, Jr., Voting in the United Nations, 17 JAG J. 67, 82
(1963).
94. Powers, supra note 87, at 82.
95. Reicher, supra note 77, at 9-20.
96. Rebecca Kahan, Building A Protective Wall Around Terrorists - How the International
Court ofJustice's Ruling in the Legal Consequences ofthe Construction ofA Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory Made the World Safer for Terrorists and More Dangerous for Member
States of the United Nations, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 827, 847 (2005); Morriss, supra note 81, at
931. However, this conclusion has recently been called into question. See Andrew J. Carswell,
Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution, 18 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 1, 17 (2013). Carswell argues that because a veto power is conferred on the P-5 by
Article 27(3) of the Charter, its use is not necessarily a failure. Instead, he asserts that a veto "is a
necessary, but not a sufficient prerequisite" for the GA to act under the Resolution.
97. L.H. Woolsey, The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the United Nations, 45 AM. J.
INT'LL. 129, 133 (1951).
98. Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 .C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9).
99. G.A. Res. ES 10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 12, 2003).
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The Court further refers to the fact that the General Assembly
adopted resolution ES-10/14 during its Tenth Emergency Special
Session, convened pursuant to [The Uniting for Peace Resolution],
which provides that if the Security Council fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, the General Assembly may consider the matter
immediately with a view to making recommendations to Member
States. The Court finds that the conditions laid down by that
resolution were met when the Tenth Emergency Special Session
was convened; that was in particular true when the General
Assembly decided to request an opinion, as the Security Council
was at that time unable to adopt a resolution concerning the
construction of the wall as a result of the negative vote of a
permanent member. 1
00
The Court, proceeding to the substance of the opinion, found that the
Israeli-constructed wall was contrary to international law.1 1 In response
to the ICJ ruling, the Assembly reconvened the emergency session and
passed Resolution EC-10/15, which demanded that Israel comply with
the ICJ opinion. This chain of events shows exactly how the Resolution
can, in effect, allow the General Assembly to veto the veto.
10 2
Unfortunately, while this opinion served to legitimize the Resolution, it
has not been invoked since. Of the ten times the Resolution has been used,
the Assembly has recommended military force only once. 103 This is likely
because while the Resolution appears to still be a viable option for the
Assembly to speak in the face of a Council deadlock, there are some
impediments to its use and limitations on its reach.
3. Limitations on the Uniting for Peace Resolution
The first and most significant limitation is that the General Assembly
is limited to making nonbinding recommendations under the
Resolution.10 4 Therefore, a recommendation for the use of force by the
Assembly under the Resolution does not itself justify the use of force by
a state.10 5 However, a recommendation by the Assembly may still carry
significant force as a strong statement on the view of the majority of
100. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Press Release 2004/28 (July 2004).
101. G.A. Res. ES 10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2,2004).
102. Gregory Khalil, Op-Ed, Just Say No to Vetoes, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2004).
103. Carswell, supra note 95, at 7.
104. Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of
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Member States, or through a recommendation of other action, such as
economic sanctions. 
106
However, any action taken directly in opposition to a veto of one or
more P-5 members could cause serious political tensions. This becomes
even more of an issue should military action be seen as necessary despite
the lack of Council approval. Because the United Nations does not have
its own military forces, any action relies on the military and financial
support of the major powers, in essence the P-5.107 When action is taken
by some of the P-5 members directly in opposition to the veto of fellow
P-5 members, it weakens the authority of the Council as being the sole
body capable of authorizing the use of force. This could serve to
undermine the preeminence of this international body as P-5 members are
less likely to view it as the ultimate authority if, upon failing to get its
resolution passed, other P-5 states will ignore that veto and choose to act
anyway.
Finally, and arguably most influentially, some P-5 members have
come to disfavor the Resolution. The United States, once its champion,
is now its biggest critic. When the Resolution was passed, there were only
60 Members States of the United Nations, meaning that the United States
could count on being able to refer a situation to the Assembly and secure
a vote in favor of the action it wanted. However, with 193 current
members of the United Nations, a vote in favor of U.S. interest is no
longer a guarantee, and presents a risk the United States would rather not
take. 1 08
Most recently, when the United States threatened military action in
Iraq, there was a push to make use of the Resolution to pressure the
United States not to take action.109 In response, the United States engaged
in a proactive campaign to prevent the use of the Resolution, sending
messages to other Member States, which stated that "[g]iven the current
highly charged atmosphere, the United States would regard a General
Assembly session on Iraq as unhelpful and as directed against the United
States."' 0 The Resolution was never invoked.
106. Id.
107. Scan D. Murphy, Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 341,355 (2009).
108. Carswell, supra note 95, at 25.
109. Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, A UN Alternative to War: "Uniting for Peace," JURIST
(Feb. 10, 2003); Mike Billington, UN 'Unitingfor Peace'Resolution Could Demand End to US.
War on Iraq, 30 EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE REV., Apr. 11, 2003, at 42.
110. Billington, supra note 108; Cohn, supra note 92, at 347.
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4. Evaluation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a Solution to
Security Council Inaction
The Uniting for Peace Resolution presents a rare instance where the
Assembly can take action in direct response to the failure of the Security
Council to do so. This resolution applies in all situations where the
Council has considered the issue, which is considerably broader in
application than the obligatory abstention provision. Nevertheless, the
fact that the Assembly is limited to non-binding resolutions and may not
authorize force is a critical limitation. In instances where a humanitarian
crisis is under way and military intervention is needed, even an Assembly
statement contrary to that of the Council would not be enough to provide
authorization for such intervention in a manner consistent with the
Charter.
However, it arguably could provide a more legitimate way of
undertaking the type of military action which has been taken under the
authority of R2P. Because the Security Council is the only United Nations
body which can authorize the use of force, when it fails to take action, it
is as though the entire United Nations fails to take action. However, under
the Resolution, the Assembly can call a session in response to this failure
and speak as a unified body, calling for action. Although this wouldn't be
considered a legal authorization of force under the Charter, neither have
some of the other interventions taken despite a Security Council veto. For
example, Kosovo, where NATO decided to take action without Council
authority. Public opinion widely supported this action despite its
illegality, with even a United Nations commission conceding that
although it was illegal, it was legitimate. Therefore, at a minimum, this
resolution provides a way to shore up a clear statement of support for
actions taken under the principles of R2P but without Council approval.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is clear that these three potential responses to Security Council
inaction are incredibly varied. For starters-their legal basis, with one
found in the Charter, one found in a resolution, and one without a clear
legal basis. On this ground, it is clear that the obligatory abstention found
in the Charter and the Resolution have the advantage of being established
international law, which eliminates controversy over the legitimacy of
their use.
Looking to the scope of each, the obligatory abstention applies in a
narrower set of circumstances than either R2P or the Resolution, meaning
its potential for impact on this issue is limited. The extent of situations in
which R2P could apply is still subject to debate, with the version passed
[Vol. 27
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by the World Summit being limited to the four crimes of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Arguably, despite
the allowance of R2P in the case of these crimes, there will be
disagreement over when the threshold of any of them has been met so as
to warrant R2P action. The Resolution, on the other hand, has no limit
other than that the Security Council has considered the issue. Granted,
the Security Council could avoid hearing the issue, as is sometimes
accomplished through the hidden veto. However, because the threat of a
veto is usually what prevents such a referral, the potential for action
despite a veto would encourage a referral even with a veto threat. This
allows the Resolution to be directly responsive to every case which has
ended with Council inaction.
The result of the use of these three tools also differs. The obligatory
abstention prevents the exercise of a veto, but does not guarantee action
by the Council. It is very possible that when an interested state is unable
to veto action, the only impediment to action is thereby removed. Under
R2P, the authorized action is, again, unclear. Although the ICISS
formulation supported military intervention as a last resort, this view was
not adopted at the World Summit and has been increasingly disfavored
with its increasing use as a justification for questionable military action.
Finally, the roadblocks standing in the way of the effective use of
these methods as a solution to Council inaction are important
considerations. For R2P, the increasingly common interpretation of the
doctrine authorizing action only through the Security Council is a critical
limitation in allowing it to respond to inaction in that very body. Further,
its developing legal basis and controlling principles are cause for many
states to be uncomfortable with its use as it is subject to being
manipulated to each state's own political goals. On the other hand, the
obligatory abstention and the Resolution are already established and
defined, although with the abstention the lack of clarity in definition has
led to its decreasing applicability. For the Resolution, the biggest
challenge is likely in finding an Assembly willing to speak with one voice
against P-5 members who have expressed their opposition to U.N. action.
Considering the strong support behind the developing R2P doctrine
despite its many unclear aspects, there is no reason that this could not also
provide the impetus to finally nail down the details of the obligatory
abstention and overcome the stigma of utilizing the Uniting for Peace
Resolution.
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